Oil in the election
Salah Al-Mokhtar assesses the strategic goals of the
Iraqi elections
Many have made mistakes in evaluating
the ultimate objectives that lie behind the US's insistence
on holding elections in Iraq. One of the most common
mistakes is the assumption that holding elections will
help generate a democratic solution to the problem of
who should hold the reins of power in Iraq.
A second hypothesis has it that elections
will help deflect an Iraqi civil war, while a third
claims that holding elections is the only realistic
way that Iraqis will be able to rid themselves of the
occupation, as occupation forces will be able to withdraw
more easily if requested to do so by a legitimate governing
authority.
These are political theories, and they
deal with the surface appearance of events in Iraq.
However rigorous and well researched they initially
appear they are designed to obscure the central issue:
the hidden strategic objectives behind America's insistence
on holding elections. What is called for here is a considered
and objective analysis of events in Iraq that deals
with the wider strategic picture and avoids the trite
over-simplifications traded by those who have an interest
either in maintaining the occupation or in realising
Iranian interests.
Why Washington's insistence that elections
should have gone ahead despite the appalling security
situation?
America's true objectives are no longer
as mysterious as they once were. Developments over the
course of the last 20 months have provided clear indications
that the US is working to secure specific strategic
goals in Iraq should it be forced by the fierceness
of the armed resistance to leave the country.
One of the most important reasons for
insisting on holding elections is to set up an Iraqi
government that the US is able to describe as legitimate,
which could then be presented to the international community
as the product of free elections. It would then have
the authority to take decisions and sign treaties that
would be enforceable under international law. This is
exactly what America needs to make happen in order to
achieve two fundamental goals: a speedy withdrawal from
Iraq to avoid further human and material losses at the
hands of a fierce Iraqi armed resistance, and the signing
of long-term strategic and economic agreements.
Among the military treaties planned is
one that allows American military bases to be established
in the country. There will be 14 main bases to secure
American control over Iraq's oil-wells and to allow
the American military easy access to other areas in
the region. Under the economic treaties the Iraqi government
will grant American companies long-term concessions
to exploit Iraqi oil and will include, in all probability,
the privatisation of the country's oil industry.
The duration of these treaties will almost
certainly be no shorter than 25 years, since American
oil consumption is set to double in the next 10 years
even as its traditional suppliers, like Saudi Arabia,
reduce production. America will need new, relatively
unexploited sources of oil that can be accessed without
having to deal with political obstacles. Iraq is one
such source.
Another aspect of the problem is that
emerging powers such as China and India will also need
more and more oil, creating competition over oil stocks
on the market, which -- as a CIA report on the problem
of energy in the next 15 years pointed out -- falls
short of demand.
By setting up American bases in Iraq and
controlling its oil through internationally binding
treaties the US will have achieved its two primary goals,
both of which lay the foundation for the rise of an
American empire and the removal of potential rivals.
The real value of such agreements only
becomes clear when one remembers treaties such as that
concluded between America and the pre- revolutionary
Cuban government over Guantanamo Bay. Under the treaty,
the area was rented to the Americans for 99 years. Following
the revolution the Cubans demanded that America return
the bay area, but relying on the treaty they had signed
with the previous government the Americans vehemently
refused.
How much more dangerous, then, if an "elected"
Iraqi government were to sign such treaties, bearing
in mind that despite Soviet and international support
Cuba was unable to secure the return of Guantanamo Bay
in the face of American legal arguments.
Although the American occupation set out
to divide Iraq from the very beginning it has always
known that re-centralisation and re- unification would
be likely once it left. It has been vital, therefore,
to weaken Iraq internally by seeking to establish a
federal state with a weak centre and strong autonomous
regions such as those proposed in the north and south,
in addition to a triangle in the middle. Iraq can play
the role of an important regional power only if there
is a strong, centralised government that can successfully
exploit Iraq's human and economic resources, achieve
scientific and technological progress in the manner
of other third world countries and establish a resilient
infrastructure. Washington's strategy has been to break
up the Iraqi state.
Not content with toppling its government
the occupation has destroyed its infrastructure, wrecked
historical sites (such as the National Iraqi Museum)
and places of cultural importance and pillaged places
of learning.
A tripartite federal state needs to be
approved by a legitimate government and constitution.
The occupation knows full well that no occupier has
the power to authorise such a radical change in the
Iraqi state's basic structure, bound as they are by
the Geneva Conventions that forbid any change being
made in the laws and economic system of the occupied
country.
Elections, then, were vital to creating
a weakened or, as they might put it, a federal Iraq.
The elections give the federal regime internal support
from those in the north and south, and external support
from what the international community, especially if
the UN, or the Security Council, supports the results
of the election.
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